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IS IT POSSIBLE TO KNOW THAT JESUS
WAS RAISED FROM THE DEAD?
Stephen T. Davis
Philosophical discussions of religious knowledge are often general in nature,
i.e. they take place quite apart from consideration of actual items religious people
claim to know or rationally believe. In this paper I propose to approach the broad
epistemological topic of religious knowledge by taking a specific tenet of a specific religion and asking whether it can be known or rationally believed. The moral I
hope to draw is that the vastly different conclusions religious believers and nonbelievers reach about religious knowledge is due to differences in the world views
they accept.
The resurrection of Jesus from the dead is by universal consent a crucial doctrine
of the Christian faith. Thus it is natural for Christian philosophers who believe the
doctrine to ask what they can or ought to do as philosophers to defend it. Naturally,
their first impulse is to engage in some kind of rational apologetic. Though
apologetics is an enterprise that is often maligned, I believe this is an understandable and quite acceptable impulse. I will argue in this paper against a certain way of
doing apologetics, but I believe all Christians engage in the enterprise.
Let me distinguish between two sorts of apologetic arguments in favor of the resurrection of Jesus. Let us call a "soft apologetic argument" one which attempts to
demonstrate the rationality of belief in the resurrection of Jesus. And let us call a
"hard apologetic argument" one which attempts to demonstrate the irrationality of
unbelief in the resurrection of Jesus. One of my aims in this paper is to show the
limits of what philosophy can achieve on this issue. I am opposing what I consider
to be overblown claims that are made on both sides of the issue, i. e. by those who
hold that rational argument can either verify or falsify the resurrection. I do not believe it can do either, as I will try to show. As a believer in the resurrection, I naturally hold (and will argue) that Christians are within their intellectual rights in believing that Jesus was raised from the dead. I But I do not believe it can be shown
that religious skeptics are not within their intellectual rights in rejecting the doctrine.
There is a paradox that faces any philosopher who writes about the possibility of
the resurrection of Jesus. On the one hand, some believers in the resurrection hold
that the evidence in its favor is overwhelming. (I once knew a seminary professor
who was known to say: "Any rational person who honestly looks at the evidence
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for the resurrection of Jesus must be convinced by it and become a Christian.") On
the other hand, many non-believers in the resurrection hold that the claim that
Jesus was raised from the dead is perfectly absurd. (As an undergraduate 1 studied
under a man who liked to debunk the biblical miracles; one day in class he dismissed the resurrection with the statement: "1 hope everybody here knows that dead
people stay dead.")
What is the reason for this puzzling phenomenon? Why is it that people on both
sides are so convinced they are obviously correct and the others obviously wrong?
Of course, we do notice that both sides can offer explanations of the strange behavior of the other-believers can claim that non-believers are blinded by sin; nonbelievers can claim that believers are blinded by credulity and wishful thinking.
But is there anything Christian philosophers can helpfully say at this point?
Perhaps not, but 1 will try. Let me begin with some remarks on the concept of miracle.
The resurrection of Jesus from the dead is typically classified as a miracle. The
fountain-head of virtually all contemporary discussion of miracles among
philosophers is Hume' s argument against miracles in Section X of the Enquiry. 2 I
believe it is now generally recognized that Hume overstates his case. We cannot a
priori rule out the possibility of miracles or of rational belief in miracles. 3 But, as
always, Hume is not the sort of philosopher one can dismiss with a casual wave of
the hand. Much of his argument, I believe, is beyond reproach. He is mistaken that
our past experience of the normal course of events by itself settles the question
whether a miracle can ever occur; but he is surely correct that rational expectation
of what will happen is based on our best available knowledge of what has happened. He is mistaken that it can never constitute what he calls the "greater miracle" that the testifiers to a miracle are wrong; but he is surely correct that rational
people accept the epistemological principle of always rejecting the greater miracle. He is mistaken that it can never be rational to believe that a miracle has occurred; but he is surely correct that rational people will require very strong evidence
indeed before they will believe that a miracle has occurred.
Suppose a person, Jones, claims that some extraordinary event E occurred, viz.
that last night between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. Bauer Hall levitated six feet above the
ground. Naturally we would be extremely suspicious of such a claim-for the very
Humean reason that E is contrary to all our previous experience of the behavior of
large objects like buildings and thus contrary to our expectations about how Bauer
Hall will have behaved last night. And our bias in this case seems eminently
reasonable. We would be quite right to be extremely suspicious of any evidence
Jones produced or testimony Jones or others gave, even if we could not explain
their evidence or the reason for their strange belief.
It is true that the twentieth century revolution in physics has made most scientists
far more open to the possibility of highly unusual events occurring than religious
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skeptics or even some rationalistic theologians would make us believe. The physicists I know, at any rate, are seldom prepared to rule out miraculous events-what
Hume would have called transgressions of naturallaws--on a priori grounds. But,
as noted above, it still seems a sound epistemological principle that rational expectation about what is likely to occur must be based on what we know has occurred.
And since we know of no past cases in which buildings have levitated, while we
cannot rule out on a priori grounds the possibility that E occurred, we have very
strong reason to doubt that E occurred.
Accordingly, Hume is correct that we have and rightly should have a strong bias
against accepting claims that extraordinary events have occurred. We can imagine
cases-and E is certainly one such-where it would be exceedingly difficult for
this bias to be overcome. I confess I could not easily be convinced that Bauer Hall
levitated last night. But surely a point would come, if massive evidence in favor of
E continued to pile up, where the rational thing would be to lay aside or amend our
bias against events like E and accept the claim that E has occurred. At what point
would such a change of mind rationally come about? Surely we can give no general
rule. All we can say is that it would depend on the strength of our bias against
events like E, the weight of evidence in favor of E, and the possibility and plausibility of alternative explanations. Critics of Hume are certainly correct in pointing
out that there have been countless cases where such biases and the expectations
they create have been rationally overcome. Rational people would once have scoffed at the idea of airplanes, vaccines, and trips to the moon.
However, Humean arguments are still being presented by philosophers. For
example, Antony Flew offers three arguments, much in the spirit of Hume, against
those who believe in miracles. 4 (1) People who offer historical or probabilistic arguments in favor of the occurrence of a given purported miracle, Flew says, themselves presuppose the very regularity of nature and reliability of nature's laws that
they argue against. Their position is accordingly inconsistent.
(2) Once violations of natural law are in principle allowed, what control have we
over the explanations of events that are offered? For instance (these are my examples, not Flew's), why not say that in some physically inexplicable way Jesus'
body simply disappeared after the tomb was closed? Or why not say that the Jewish
leaders removed the body from the tomb but later were quite unable to produce it
and thus falsify the disciples' claims because for some psychologically inexplicable reason they forgot they had remov~d it?
(3) Even if a violation of a natural law be granted, Flew says, how could we ever
be sure it was God who is responsible for it? Since God is said to be an incorporeal
being who cannot be seen or touched, the problem seems insurmountable. Notice
also, Flew adds, that when theists talk about certain theological problems, notably
the problem of evil, they stress our inability to comprehend God or fathom his
ways. How then could we ever have rational expectations about what God will do
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given circumstances?
Much of what Flew says here is correct. First, theists do indeed presuppose regular workings of nature in order to argue that certain irregularities, i.e. miracles,
occur. But this hardly shows that their position is inconsistent. Why cannot nature,
so to speak, almost but not quite always act regularly and (if we knew enough) predictably? If it does, then those who wish to argue for certain irregularities will
naturally do so on the basis of regularities seen elsewhere. If there do tum out to be
unique events, not analogous to any others (and some scientists argue that there are
such events, e.g. the "big bang"), we will have no choice but to try to argue for
them on the basis of regular and repeatable events.
Second, the only control we either have or need have over proposed explanations of events, once miracles are allowed, is the same control we have, quite apart
from miracles, over proposed explanations in science and history in general. We
simply accept the most plausible explanations we can find and reject the others. In
my view at least, it is far more plausible to hold that God raised Jesus from the dead
than to say, for example, that his body inexplicably disappeared or that the Jewish
leaders forgot they had removed it.
Third, Flew is correct that it seems impossible ever to prove for sure that a given
event was caused by God. But if a certain event that occurs is scientifically inexplicable and fits well with a given view of God and his aims, it surely is rational
for people who hold that view of God and his aims to believe that the event was
brought about by God. If there is good reason ahead oftime to believe that a miracle-working God exists who is likely in certain circumstances (say after prayers or
as aspects of epiphanies or incarnations) to cause events like this one, it seems
reasonable to hold (though we cannot prove) that this event was caused by God.'
It looks, then, as if Hume's argument against miracles, even as expanded by
Flew, fails. So in theory at least perhaps our strong commitment to such generalizations as "dead people stay dead" could be overcome. Just as we came rationally
to believe in airplanes, vaccines, and trips to the moon, and just as we could come
rationally to believe that Bauer Hall levitated, so in theory at least we could come
rationally to believe in the miracle of Jesus' resurrection from the dead. But in
practice could such ever be the case? One difficulty that needs to be cleared up concerns the term "miracle." For quite understandable reasons, the word is usually defined in terms of transgressions or violations of natural laws. Critics have been
quick to point out a complication, however. Since laws of nature are human inventions, i. e. descriptions of observed regularities, if we really became aware of a violation of (what we understood to be) a law of nature, they say, we should not proclaim a miracle but rather simply amend our understanding of the law of nature in
question--even reject it altogether, if necessary. The issue here is complex, and I
do not wish to explore it in detail. But fortunately it need not be explored, even in
a paper on the resurrection of Jesus, an event often considered the paradigmatic
jlj
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miracle.
For Christians won't mind one bit if it turns out, through some sound process of
reasoning, that no miracles occur, i.e. that no true natural laws are ever violated
but rather that some weak ones are just occasionally discovered to be inadequate.
As long as it is still true, for example, that Jesus was born of a virgin, was raised
from the dead, healed people, turned water into wine, etc., it wiIl be a matter of
profound indifference to them whether natural laws are ever violated.
However, since the issue is unclear, I will continue in this paper to speak ofthe
resurrection as a miracle. For it must be admitted that with the resurrection we are
talking not just about a highly unusual event but an event which, given our best
knowledge of the workings of the world, seems causally impossible. Almost any
event that occurs can be described in such a way as to have been or at least rationally seemed to have been highly improbable before it occurred. One hundred years
ago or even five years ago what would have been the odds that in 1981 a Claremont
philosopher who coaches soccer and whose father was a Nebraska cattle rancher
would write a paper entitled "Is It Possible to Know That Jesus Was Raised From
the Dead?" that you would read? The odds would have been low indeed, but the
point is that there is nothing in this description (as there is in a description of the resurrection) that seems causally impossible given our best knowledge. The resurrection is not just a unique and improbable event but an intellectual scandal. Accordingly, an event should probably only be considered a miracle if no purported
explanation of it that crucially omits God is a good explanation. It just might be
possible to offer a good explanation of my writing and your reading this paper that
fails to mention God. And so our doing so, however improbable it may be, is not a
miracle. But the resurrection of Jesus, if it occurred, in all probability could not be
explained without God, and so (if it occurred) is probably a miracle.
It is sometimes said that every miracle is ambiguous in that it can be interpreted
either as an act of God or as a surprising and perhaps inexplicable natural event.
But surely this can be said not just about miracles but about almost any event, as
John Hick has often argued. 6 Name virtually any event, and the religious believer
and the religious skeptic can disagree on how to interpret it. The one may well see
it as an act of God and the other will not. They do not differ, so to speak, on the
facts (both experience the event and acknowledge that it has occurred) but on how
to interpret or account for the facts.
However, there is a difference between miracles and natural events in this regard. With natural events (e.g. someone's recovering from a serious illness) the
believer and the skeptic do not differ on the question whether the event occurred;
both will agree it did. Their difference concerns the cause and meaning of the
event. With miracles, however (or at least with certain ofthem, e.g. the resurrection of Jesus), the believer and the skeptic will typically differ on the fundamental
question of what precisely occurred. They differ here on the facts.
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Accordingly, influenced by our earlier distinction between hard and soft
apologetics, let us make a distinction between hard and soft miracles. A soft miracle, let us say, is a miracle which religious skeptics can consistently agree has occurred; it is just that they will disagree with religious believers on its cause and
meaning. If Jones, apparently doomed with cancer, is after prayer and fasting
found to be well and free of cancer, this may well constitute a soft miracle. Skeptics can consistently agree that Jones was gravely ill but now is well-they will
simply deny that Jones' recovery was due to God. A hard miracle, on the other
hand, is one which is very difficult for religious skeptics to explain naturalistically7
and so skeptics will not want to allow that it has occurred. The resurrection of Jesus
appears to be a hard miracle-skeptics apparently cannot agree that it has occurred
(not as the event is recorded in the Gospels, at any rate) without abandoning religious skepticism. The strategy of consistent skeptics must accordingly be to argue
that the event has not in fact occurred.
Hard miracles are obviously going to be appealing to rational apologists for religious faith. It is tempting to think ofthem as good devices for evangelism, i.e. for
converting people from religious skepticism to religious faith. But have any hard
miracles occurred? Religious believers hold that the answer is yes, and religious
skeptics will say no. As a Christian, I hold that certain hard miracles have occurred, and I believe that the resurrection of Jesus is one of them. But have any events
occurred that can be shown to be hard miracles? Here I am doubtful. It certainly
seems possible to me that an event occur which it would be irrational for anyone to
deny is a hard miracle, but to my knowledge no such events have occurred-not
even the resurrection. Soft miracles, then, are religiously ambiguous because they
can be interpreted as natural events; hard miracles are religiously ambiguous because the ones that have purportedly occurred can apparently be rationally denied.
How the resurrection can rationally be denied I will consider presently.
In order to make the problem we face more concrete, let us look at the way believers and non-believers in the resurrection of Jesus can most persuasively present
their case.
Believers in the resurrection fIrst stress the unity of the New Testament witness
to the resurrection. Despite differences in some details-believers will argue-the
biblical writers, who give us our earliest testimony to the events after the cricifIxion, unanimously agree that Jesus rose from the dead.
Second, believers in the resurrection will point out that there are certain facts
surrounding the resurrection that have virtually been demonstrated by historical
scholarship and that no competent biblical, theological, or historical scholar denies them. They are, preeminently, that Jesus died on a cross, that certain people
later came to believe that God had raised him from the dead, and that the firm belief
in the resurrection that these people had was the heart of the message they proclaimed and the reason they so radically changed. Disheartened, confused, and
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fearful immediately after the crucifixion, they quickly became determined, bold,
and courageous. The most plausible explanation of these facts-so believers in the
resurrection will argue-is that Jesus did indeed rise from the dead and show himself to the disciples. It does not seem sensible to claim that the Christian Church, a
spiritual movement whose vitality changed the world, was started by charlatans or
dupes. If the disciples knew that Jesus was not really risen they were charlatans. If
they believed he was risen when in fact he was not they were dupes.
Third, something of an embarassment in the position of non-believers in the resurrection can be pointed out-their inability to offer an acceptable alternative
explanation of the known facts surrounding the resurrection of Jesus. The old 19th
century rationalistic explanations (swoon theory, stolen body, wrong tomb, etc.)
all seem to collapse of their own weight once spelled out, and no strong new theory
has emerged as the consensus of scholars who deny that the resurrection occurred.
One recent full-blooded attempt to offer such an explanation is Hugh Schonfield's
The Passover Plot,S a bold and entertaining book. But with its highly fanciful
hypotheses and selective use of evidence it has drawn much criticism and precious
little support from scholars.
The plain fact is that most contemporary Christian theologians who do not believe that Jesus was dead for three days and then actually lived again offer no explanation. Many suggest only vague poetic metaphors like "spiritual resurrection,"
the "Easter vision of the disciples," or "dramatic imagery seen through the eyes of
faith." Some hint that parapsychological phenomena were at work. But does all
this vague talk mean anything?, the believer in the resurrection will bluntly ask.
Isn't it just theological jargon amounting to this: "I can't bring myself to believe
that a real resurrection happened, but something (I don't know what) must have
happened to account for the disciples' faith"? And surely all this is odd, the believer continues: if the resurrection did not occur it is at least prima facie puzzling
that no consensus alternative explanation of the known facts has emerged. All in
all, the believer will say, the most rational position is to believe that Jesus really
did, as claimed, rise from the dead.
But non-believers in the resurrection can make an impressive case too. They will
first argue that the biblical testimony is unreliable. It was written years after the
event by unsophisticated, myth-prone people who were more interested in formulating statements of faith and in furthering Christian ends than writing accurate
history. Furthermore, the evidence they present is contradictory: How many
women visited the tomb? Had the sun risen or was it still dark? Was there one angel
(or young man) or two? Were they inside the tomb or outside? Did the women keep
silent or run to tell the disciples? Were the disciples told to stay in Jerusalem or to
go to Galilee? Was the resurrected Jesus in physical or spiritual form? Did the ascension occur immediately after the resurrection, or forty days later?
But the non-believer's strongest argument will run as follows: "Granted I have
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no plausible alternative explanation of the known facts; and granted that on the
basis of the known facts and available possible explanations of them the chances
are (let's be as generous as possible) 99 out of 100 that the resurrection really happened; still we must ask the following fatal question: What are the chances that a
man dead for three days would live again?" In short, the non-believer will claim
that even if the believer's arguments are strong and even if non-believers can't say
for sure what did happen, by far the most sensible position is to deny that the resurrection occurred. For the probability we should assign to the statement "People
dead for three days stay dead" is very, very high. Thus the position of the non-believer amounts to this: "I don't know exactly what happened after the crucifixionit was, after all, nearly 2000 years ago and by now it's very hard to tell-but whatever happened, it certainly wasn't a resurrection."
But a truly vital factor in the debate would be omitted if we stopped here. For we
must consider the very different metaphysical world views typically held by believers and non-believers in the resurrection. The non-believer's position is probably convincing to the non-believer not primarily because of evidence or arguments in its favor but because it is entailed by the world view he or she accepts.
Let's call that world view naturalism. It is the view, we will say, which holds that
the following four statements are true: (1) Nature alone exists. The word "nature"
is difficult to define precisely, but let us say that it is the sum total of what could in
principle be observed by human beings or be studied by methods analogous to
those used in the natural sciences. Accordingly, naturalism excludes God, or at
least the theistic God. (2) Nature is eternal. Nature is an uncreated thing; there is no
moment in time when it does not exist; it is not contingent. (3) Nature is uniform.
There are no non-natural events (e.g. miracles); rather, nature is regular, continuous. (4) Every event is explicible. In principle at least, any event can be explained
in terms of nature or natural processes, i.e. by explanatory methods similar to
those used in the natural sciences.
Similarly, the believer's position is probably convincing to the believer not
primarily because of evidence or arguments in its favor but because it dovetails
with the world view he or she accepts. Let's call that world view supernaturalism.
It is the view, we will say, which holds (1) that something beside nature exists, viz.
God; (2) that nature depends for its existence on God; (3) that the regularity of nature can be and occasionally is interrupted by miraculous acts of God; and (4) that
such events are humanly quite unpredictable and inexplicable. 9
All people interpret their experience within a certain philosophical framework.
For many people, their philosophical assumptions exclude God's existence and the
possibility of miracles. Such people presumably reject the resurrection not because
the evidence for it is weak. Surely if the resurrection were not essentially miraculous (if it were like, say, the crucifixion) few rational persons would doubt it. They
reject the resurrection because it does not fit with their naturalistic world view. The
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essentially miraculous nature of the resurrection impels them to discount the evidence for it despite their inability to explain what did happen or how the disciples
came to believe in the resurrection.
Well then-you will want to ask at this point--did the resurrection of Jesus
occur? Which is more likely-that the resurrection occurred, or not? To put it in
Hume's tenns, which is the lesser miracle? My own view will come as no surprise.
As a supernaturalist and as a Christian it seems to me that the evidence in favor of
the resurrection is strong. Perhaps it can even be said to be compelling for those
Christians who admit the possibility of miracles. 10 But the problem is that for those
who don't, the available evidence i~ not likely to be compelling.
For as we have seen, the odd thing is that a decision a person makes whether to
believe in the resurrection is usually made on some basis other than the evidence
pro and con. (Is this why miracles seem to bring so few people to faith, why Jesus
was reluctant to perfonn spectacular public miracles?) Those who believe in Christ
believe in the resurrection; those who accept naturalism do not.
There is a curious circularity here. As I noted earlier, I believe philosophers
have shown over against Hume that miracles can occur; the real question is
whether any have occurred. But when we tum to historical evidence for a purported miracle, e.g. the resurrection, it turns out that a decision whether or not it
occurred nonnally turns on whether or not one believes that miracles can occur.
Perhaps this circularity explains the puzzle with which we began, viz. why Christians find the evidence for the resurrection so utterly compelling while non-believers think it sheer foolishness to believe in the resurrection. From the perspective of
naturalism, the resurrection does seem like a prescientific myth. From the perspective of supernaturalism, or at least Christian supernaturalism, the resurrection
seems the best explanation of the evidence.
The upshot of what I have been arguing is that both belief and disbelief in the resurrection of Jesus can be rational. It is a mistake to argue either (1) that it is never
rational to believe in the resurrection of Jesus, or (2) that belief in the resurrection
of Jesus is the only rational position. Both arguments have been presented; let me
comment briefly on each.
(1) Some Christian theologians in recent years have argued against belief in a
real resurrection of Jesus from what clearly amounts to a perspective very near
naturalism. Rather than rejecting talk of the resurrection entirely, as a religious
skeptic might do, they typically offer what might be called reductive theories of
the resurrection. "What 'Jesus rose from the dead' really means," they say, "is
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ," where the blank is filled in with a way of understanding the resurrection that does not actually involve a dead man coming back to
life. Thus Rudolf Bultmann:
Indeed,faith in the resurrection is really the same asfaith in the saving ef-
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ficacy of the cross, faith in the cross. as the cross of Christ. II

And Willi Marxsen:
Talk of the resurrection of Jesus is an interpretation designed to express
the fact that my faith has a source and that source is Jesus ... Jesus is risen
in that his offer meets us today and in that, if we accept it, he gives us this
new life. 12
Bultmann does not try to hide the fact that his understanding of the resurrection
of Jesus rests on a basically naturalist position (I say basically naturalist because he
does believe in God). Modem people can no longer believe in mythological
stories, he says. The idea of dead people rising is utterly inconceivable and incredible to us. In a famous passage, Bultmann says:
It is impossible to use the electric light and the wireless and to avail ourselves of modem medical and surgical discoveries, and at the same time
to believe in the New Testament world of spirits and miracles. We may
think we can manage it in Our own lives, but to expect others to do so is to
make the Christian faith unintelligible and unacceptable to the modem
world. 13

Although much could be said in response to this point of view, let me limit myself to two comments. First, the rather condescending air theologians such as
Bultmann and Marxsen typically take toward pre-modem people, e.g. people in
New Testament times, seems to me altogether unwarranted. "Such people could
believe in myths, spirits, and miracles," it is said, "but we modems cannot." The
implication is that the poor devils just didn't have the benefit of our modem scientific knowledge and reasoning power-that is why they believed such silly things.
But surely this is grossly exaggerated. If miracles and resurrections were supposed
to be so commonplace in ignorant times like the first century, why was the resurrection of Jesus taken to be so significant? I would have thought that the idea of a
man dead for three days living again was no less intellectually scandalous to first
century people than it is to us. (Notice the reaction of the apostle Thomas in John
20 and of the Stoic and Epicurean philosophers in Acts 17 to talk of the resurrection.) On the whole, 1 would have thought that first century people were no more
superstitious, credulous, or just plain stupid than we are.
Second, naturalism is not the only rational position a person can take.
Bultmann's statement about the wireless is admirably picturesque and pointed, but
I see no reason to believe it. Precisely why (or in what sense) is it impossible for a
person who uses the wireless and the electric light to believe that miracles occur? I
am unable to find any plausible construal of Bultmann's remarks, especially when
there are today so many apparently quite rational people who both use the wireless
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and believe in miracles.
Interpreting Bultmann's remark, Van Harvey says:
He meant that the act of turning a switch, speaking over a microphone,
visiting a doctor or a psychiatrist is a practical commitment to a host of beliefs foreign to those of the New Testament. It is to say that the world of
modern theory-be it electrical, atomic, biological, even psychological-is a part of the furniture of our minds and that we assume this in our
reading of the newspapers, in our debates over foreign policy, in our law
courts, and, it needs to be added, in our writing of history . In other words,
our daily intercourse reveals that we, in fact, do not believe in a threestory universe or in the possession of the mind by either angelic or demonic beings. 14
I do not wish to comment here on demon-possession or on the famed three-story
universe Bultmann and others think the New Testament writers believed in. The
real question is: Do our modern beliefs and practices somehow commit us to
naturalism or near naturalism? Again, I am unable to see why. It is quite correct
that we are committed to giving naturalistic explanations (i.e. explanations that do
not involve appeals to miracles) of the vast majority of the events we see occurring.
But so were first century people. I fail to see any good reason, either from
Bultmann or Harvey, why a contemporary person cannot consistently be a supernaturalist.
(2) Other Christian thinkers, especially theologically conservative ones, try to
show that belief in the resurrection of Jesus is the only rational position. IS But one
lesson Christian philosophers and apologists can draw from this paper is that if
God's existence and the possibility of miracles are not first allowed, i.e. if
naturalism is not first abandoned, it is difficult for evidence for, or arguments for,
the resurrection to produce a conversion. The seminary professor who thought that
any rational person who fairly examines the evidence must convert was wrong. A
naturalist can say- and unless we can refute naturalism such a position seems to
me rational- "Yes, the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus is strong; I can't produce a good alternative explanation of what happened, but a resurrection just
couldn't have happened."
Apologists for the resurrection are quick to criticize this position, and if we are
careful only to look at it from a certain rather acute angle it does look weak.
"True"-the apologist says-"secular historians will not accept the resurrection
because they insist on a priori grounds that it could not have happened. But why so
insist? Why not be open-minded rather than dogmatic about what we might find in
history or in our experience? Let history speak for itself; don't interpret it only
from the perspective of pre-conceived assumptions."
Although I am ultimately in sympathy with this criticism of naturalism, I believe

Stephen T. Davis

158

it is often presented in far too facile a manner. It ignores the rationality of our bias
against extraordinary events. I ask: How would you respond if somebody in all apparent sincerity told you that Bauer Hall levitated for an hour last night? Or: How
would you respond if someone in all sincerity told you John Lennon came back to
life three days after his death?
What follows from this, I believe, is that the aim of Christian philosophers who
want to defend the resurrection ought not be hard apologetics. Unless naturalism
can first be refuted, it is pointless to try to produce rational arguments which by
their logical power will coerce conversions, so to speak. Disbelief in the resurrection does seem to be a rational position. The aim of Christian philosophers ought to
be soft apologetics. They ought to try to defend belief in the resurrection against
the objections of critics; demonstrate the rationality of supernaturalism; and show
that given supernaturalist assumptions, belief in the resurrection makes good
sense.
What, then, about the question that forms this paper's title? Is it possible to
know that Jesus was raised from the dead? Naturally, the answer will depend on
what is meant by the word "know." If we accept a Cartesian notion of knowledge,
whereby I know p if and only if I believe p and p is immune to all conceivable
doubt, the answer is no. The same negative answer holds even if we accept the
much weakened but far more plausible notion that I know p if and only if I believe
p and p is immune to all rational doubt. As I have argued, the resurrection can rationally be doubted.
We did note, however, that the crucial difference in how one is likely to evaluate
the claim that Jesus was raised is made by the world view one accepts. The deepest
question we can ask in this area accordingly emerges: which world view is more
plausible, naturalism or supernaturalism? Unfortunately, answering that question
is far beyond the scope of this paper and, perhaps, of my ability.
But if we ask the question with which we began in this way: Can it be rationally
believed that Jesus was raised from the dead?, the answer is yes.
Claremont McKenna College
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6. See John Hick, Faith and Knowledge (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1957), pp.
182-191.
7. But perhaps not impossible. A skeptic who is present at the resurrection of a person dead for three
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The believer accepts the view that the Bible is in some sense revelatory and reliable and the non-believer does not. See, for example, Hew, p. 158: "We must never forget that it is only if we take for
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